People sometim es w onder abou t lawyers. The legal profession e njoys enormous prestige and respect; yet we also v iew it w ith s uspicion. Folklore says la wyers are smart; but they are s harpe rs. They are pragmatic" useful, but unprincipl ed. Every attorney knows he is n ot a folk hero. Carl Sandburg's lines reflect the popular attitude: " Wh y is th er e always a secret singingl When a lawyer cashes in? 1 Why does a hearse horse snickerl Hauling a lawyer away?"
Examples of Conflict
Th ere are exa mples aplenty of genui ne con flict s between ordinary morality and lawyers' ro le morality:
(1) The client is th e prosperous president of a savings-a nd-loan association . In leaner days he had borrowed a lmost $5000 from a man working for him as a carpenter. He now wishes to avoid repaying the debt by running th e s tatute of limitations. He is sued by the ca rp e nter and call s hi s lawyer (Zab,lla v. Pak,l, 242 F. 2d 452 (1957) ).
The ABA Code of Profess ional Responsibility is unambiguous about the lawyer's duty in this example : "A lawye r shall not inte ntionally fai l to seek the lawfu l objectives of hi s client through rea sonably available m ea ns permitted by law." Ro le morality demands that the lawye r .assist his client in this project. From the point of view of ordinary morality, however" it is morall y wrong to assist someone in reneging on his legitimate debt.
(2) The client has raped a woman, been found guilty by reason of insanity, and in s titutionalized. He wishes to appeal the decision by asserting a technica l defense, namely, that he was denied the ri g ht to a speedy tri al. (Langworlh y v. Sial" 39 Md. App. 559 (1978 ), rev'd. 284 Md. 588 (1979 .
In this example, the client is not attempting to do something immoral, but it is , neverth eless, clearly contrary to the ge nera l interest to loose a mad rapis't on the public. From the point of view of ordinary morality, the lawyer who asserts this defense is acting irresponsibly . As in the previous example" however, the ABA Code specifies a n adamantine dut y to assert the client's legal rights, including the technical defense.
(3) A yo uth, badly injured in an automobile wreck, sues the driver responsible for th e injury . The driver's defense lawyer has hi s own doctor examine th e youth; the doctor discovers an aortic ane urism, apparently caused by the accident, that the boy's doctor had not fo und . The aneurism is life-threatening un less operated on . But the defe nse lawyer reali zes tha t if th e youth learns of the aneurism he will demand a much higher settlement. (S paulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W. zd 704 (1962)).
The lawyer"s role responsibilities are again unam-biguous. H e must keep the client's secrets unless th e c1 ien t is con templating commission of a crime. Secrets are, according to t he Code, "information gained in the professional r elations hip. . the disclosure of w hich wo uld be likely to be detrimental to the client ." Thu s, the kn owledge of the aneuris m is a secr et. Nevert heless, it is plai n that ordinaril y, wit hout the special duty of confidentia lity, it wou ld be incumbent o n a person to te ll the yout h . An innocent life is at stake .
One says in discussions of exa mples like these: the lawye r is free to refuse the case. Indeed, if the lawyer's outrage is grea t enough to prejud ice his judgment, he is required to do so. Now, it mus t be admitted that refusal or wit hdrawa l from a morally trou bleso me case.may be the mostpracticai method to r elieve a la wyer of a n otherwise intolera ble conflict. But the fact that such a s trategy is available does not resolve the moral iss ue itself, for our adversary system is based on the proposition that some lawyer sho uld take the ca se. If it is morally obligatory for the " las t lawyer in town" to do so, it mu st be morally permissible for him . But of course, w ha t is pe rmi ss ible for the las t lawyer in to wn is permi ssi ble for any lawyer, else lega l eth ics becomes a m atter of musical chairs in which the last lawyer to opt out of the role is th e loser. Thus, t he possibility of opting o ut does not yield a strategy for reconciling the lawye r 's ro le with ordinary m ora lity. No r does it resolve the examples to note that in each the proble m arises from a law that permits morally dubious outcomes. It is too simple to blam e the law rather than the lawyer, for in every case the lawye r mu st decide to be the age nt w ho brings about the outco me. It is th e lawye r w ho pushes the r ed button.
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Resolving the Conflict
We may wan t to resolve conflicts between ordinary morality and role mora lity by denying that there is any meaningful distinction between the two. If it is mora ll y wrong to harm an innocent person g ratuitously, th e n how can going to law school, being admitted to the bar, and taki ng money for the action make it ri ght? The distinction might also be denied by defending th e universality of role morality. Sociologis ts s uggest that we always ac t in some socia l role or o ther. Every role carries w ith it its own behavioral norms. By this reasoning, all mo ra lities mus t accommodate to roles, and we shou ld be skeptica l of the notion of an ord in ary morality that fai ls to make these acco mmodations. Thus, the d istinction seems do~hly s uspect.
If we a llow the distinction, we must explain exactl y how an appeal to role morality is supposed to justify an ac tion that would otherw ise seem morally unacceptab le . An obvious move is to claim that (1) moral responsibility for ihe action falls on the role itse lf and not o n the role age nt, and (2) th e role itself is morally desirable. The first of these, however, is simply false. We wo ul d not a llow a torturer to evade moral responsibi lity by saying, "I personally would never pull out you r toenails, but that's m y job." If the role is imm ora l, its immora li ty accuses, not excuses, th e person w ho holds it . Thus, the whole burden o f t he arg um ent falls on the clai m that the role is a morall y good o ne.
But even t he goodness of the ro le itself may not turn out to matter. In the second example, for instance, we might find o urselves inclined to say, "W ho cares about the role? All th at matters is that this lawyer is loosing a mad r apist on the city." However
THE LAWYERS KNOW TOO MUCH
The lawyers, Bo b, know too much. They are chums of the books of old John Marshall. They know it all, what a dead hand wrote, A stiff dead h a nd and its knuckles crumbling, Th e bones of the fingers a thin white as h .
The la wyers know a dead man's thoughts too well.
In the heel s of the higg ling lawyers, Bob, Too many slippe r y ifs and buts and howeve rs, T oo much h er einbefore provided w heras, Too many doors to go in and out of. The question, then, is whether the individual action or the general policy that requires it is the proper subject of moral evaluation. The appeal to role morality assumes that the evaluation of policies rather than individual acts is the right approachthat, for example, if the policy of zealous advocacy is on balance a good one the lawyer should follow it even on occasions when he or she knows it will result in harm. And indeed, there is a good reason for p' utting policies over acts: it leads fo greater predictability and regularity in social behavior. If we could not count on persons occupying cet:"tain social roles to act according to the expectations of the roles, we would live in a very capricious society indeed .
A strong case can be made, however, in favor of directing moral evaluation to individual acts instead. An agent confronts his decisions one at a time: if, after balancing the wrong done by breaking role against the wrong done by acting in role, he sees that an action is morally unacceptable, it cannot be correct to sweep this insight under the rug by saying that the individual action is not the proper subject of moral evaluation.
But if acts rather than policies are the objects of moral judgments, it may not be possible to justify behavior by appealing to social roles.
An Analogy to Public Officials
The conflict between role obligations and ordinary morality is a familiar one in politics, where the risk of "dirty hands" is especially acute. Moral compromise is the risk if one is to act in the public realm: to try to keep clean hands is self-indulgent. The morality of clean hands is the morality of private life; it is superseded by a role morality when one becomes a 8 public officia l because the community interest is more important than o ne's own private interest, even one's private moral interest. That, at any rate, is the most plausible justification of political morality. Now, the lawyer resembles t h e publi c official in certain obvious respects. Like the politician, the lawyer seeks to promote certain interests through verba l and persuasive means, in a situat ion frequently marked by maneuvering and threats. Most importantly, the lawyer, like the politician, is acting on behalf of someone else; both lawyer and officia l represent a constituency .
But there's the rub. The conflict between political and ord inary morality is r esolved in favor of the former only because of the importance of t h e public interest. The lawyer, however, typically represents private and not publi c interests. Even so-ca lled public interest la wyers treat the public interest that they hope to represent through the persons of private clients. How can the attorney claim to be bound by the "dirty hand s" morality of public officials when he or she is acting on behalf of a merely private interest? How can a la wyer ever be permitted to do for a priva te client w hat neither would be permitted to do for him se lf? Conclusions This is not intended to deny that overriding role obligations may jus tify otherwise suspect legal practices. But if the notion of a role morality that can at times supplant ordinary morality is to be made coherent, a sophisticated account must be offered of this distinction, an account that spells out exactly how role morality is to be appealed to in offering jus tification s for action. If the analogy to public officials is to be pressed, similarities between the concept of legal and political representation must be carefully explored.
If such clarification is not forthcoming, it may turn out that role morality grants the la wyer no moral privileges or immunities. It may turn out that anything that is morally wrong for a non-lawyer to do on behalf of another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well. The legal profession may have to find another exculpating plea to offer Sandburg'S hearse horse.
